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Self-control is considered broadly important for many domains of life. One of its
unfortunate features, however, is that it tends to wane over time, with little agreement
about why this is the case. Recently, there has been a push to address this problem
by looking to the literature in exercise physiology, specifically the work on the central
governor model of physical fatigue. Trying to explain how and why mental performance
wanes over time, the central governor model suggests that exertion is throttled by
some central nervous system mechanism that receives information about energetic
bodily needs and motivational drives to regulate exertion and, ultimately, to prevent
homeostatic breakdown, chiefly energy depletion. While we admire the spirit of
integration and the attempt to shed light on an important topic in psychology, our
concern is that the central governor model is very controversial in exercise physiology,
with increasing calls to abandon it altogether, making it a poor fit for psychology. Our
concerns are threefold. First, while we agree that preservation of bodily homeostasis
makes for an elegant ultimate account, the fact that such important homeostatic
concerns can be regularly overturned with even slight incentives (e.g., a smile) renders
the ultimate account impotent and points to other ultimate functions for fatigue. Second,
despite the central governor being thought to take as input information about the
metabolic needs of the body, there is no credible evidence that mental effort actually
consumes inordinate amounts of energy that are not already circulating in the brain.
Third, recent modifications of the model make the central governor appear like an all-
knowing homunculus and unfalsifiable in principle, thus contributing very little to our
understanding of why people tend to disengage from effortful tasks over time. We
note that the latest models in exercise physiology have actually borrowed concepts
and models from psychology to understand physical performance.
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Self-control is important. Those with high self-control as kids
tend to grow up to be happier, healthier, and richer adults who are
less likely to commit crimes, abuse drugs, raise children as single-
parents, or end up in prison (Moffitt et al., 2011). Self-control
might be as important as being intelligent.
An unfortunate feature about self-control, however, is that is
appears to wane over time (Baumeister et al., 2007), with people
being less willing to exert effort the longer they have already
exerted effort. Despite general agreement that people become
fatigued, that effortful control has a refractory period, there is
little agreement about why this is the case. Recently, a group
of psychologists suggested that work from exercise physiology
might offer clues.
Evans et al. (2015) integrated work from exercise physiology,
specifically the literature on the central governor model of
physical fatigue (St Clair Gibson and Noakes, 2004; Noakes,
2012), to offer a more complete picture of the nature of mental
fatigue and self-control failure. While we admire the spirit of
integration and the attempt to shed light on an important topic
in psychology, our concern is that the central governor model is
very controversial among exercise physiologists, with increasing
calls to abandon it altogether (Weir et al., 2006; Marcora,
2008; Shephard, 2009). In this mini review, a collaboration
between an exercise physiologist (Samuele M. Marcora) and a
psychologist (Michael Inzlicht), we outline some problems with
the central governor model, discussing how it might be unfit for
psychology.
MAINTAINING EFFORTFUL CONTROL
OVER TIME IS HARD
In what is now a classic body of research, Baumeister et al. (1998,
2007) uncovered an important quality of self-control—it wanes
over time. People do not tend to maintain self-control over long
stretches of time, with self-control performance deteriorating
with repeated exertions. This so-called ego depletion effect,
whereby effortful control tends to fail when it follows previous
bouts of effortful control, has been supported by over 200 separate
studies (Hagger et al., 2010; but, see Carter et al., 2015; Inzlicht
et al., 2015; Hagger et al., in press).
In addition to uncovering a basic detail about maintaining
effort over time, Baumeister et al. (2007) offered an explanation
based on the notion of limited resources. According to the limited
resource model of control, effortful control relies on a limited
resource that depletes quickly with use, such that initial exertions
consume this resource, leaving less available for later use. So when
people exert effortful control at Time 1, they consume this limited
resource until the resource is exhausted such that people cannot
control themselves at Time 2.
PROBLEMS WITH A RESOURCE
ACCOUNT OF SELF-CONTROL
Despite the intuitive appeal of the resource account, many
questions remain about how precisely depletion comes about
(Inzlicht and Berkman, 2015). The first problem has to do with
the precise identity of the resource underlying control. Although
initial research on glucose indicated that it might be the resource
underlying effortful control (Gailliot et al., 2007), these findings
have proven very controversial, being challenged on multiple
grounds (Kurzban, 2010; Beedie and Lane, 2012; Molden et al.,
2012).
A second problem is the increasing number of studies
that are inconsistent with a strict resource account (Inzlicht
and Schmeichel, 2012; Masicampo et al., 2014). If self-control
wanes over time because of the literal depletion of some
resource that has run out, or that threatens to run out, it
is difficult to understand how simple incentives can turn this
effect around (Muraven and Slessareva, 2003). If the resource
that underlines self-control is exhausted by a previous task,
how is it possible that thinking about one of your core values
(Schmeichel and Vohs, 2009), receiving a surprising gift (Tice
et al., 2007), or focusing on one’s ongoing feeling states (Saunders
et al., 2016) can instantly restore the resource and, thus, self-
control?
Both problems suggest that self-control’s refractory period
is not satisfactorily explained by accounts that rely on the
notion of limited resources and that it might be better
explained by models where motivation plays a central role.
A number of related such models have emerged, and while
each emphasizes different things, they all converge on the
notion that self-control is the product of priorities, motives,
and values that change dynamically over time (Kurzban
et al., 2013; Inzlicht et al., 2014; Kool and Botvinick,
2014).
Though these motivational accounts do a better job of
explaining the existing data, the ultimate explanation for
why self-control wanes over time is somewhat unsatisfying.
While we suspect that ultimate accounts based on the notion
of maintaining balance between various goals and avoiding
opportunity costs (Kurzban, 2016; Francis and Inzlicht, in
press) might offer biologically plausible ultimate accounts,
phenomenologically, it feels like we run out of energy when
we are fatigued, even if such conceptions are historically new
(Hockey, 2013). Certainly, the argument goes, dwindling energy
supplies must play some part in the feeling of fatigue. And this is
where the central governor model comes in.
THE CENTRAL GOVERNOR MODEL
The central governor model has the attractive quality of
taking into account information about both energy supply
and motivational state (Noakes, 2012). As such, Evans et al.
(2015) offer it as a way out of the current impasse. Given
the clear role that motivation plays (Inzlicht et al., 2014)
and the intuitive appeal of notions about dwindling energy,
the idea of a central governor seems like a perfect fit. In
brief, the central governor is proposed to be some central
nervous system mechanism that takes as input information
about energetic needs, current physiological states, and various
motivational drives to regulate physical exertion to save
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the organism from catastrophic homeostatic failures during
physical exertion (Noakes et al., 2005). The argument here
is that fatigue stemming from physical and mental exertion
may not be separate systems, with the latter co-opting
the pre-existing neural machinery of the former. Critically,
the model offers a plausible ultimate explanation for why
self-control seems to wane over time. Without a central
governor that throttles physical effort, people might exert
themselves to the point of hurting themselves and causing
serious bodily damage. No bodily harm is caused by mental
exertion, but the same throttle mechanism is thought to be at
work.
Despite being attractive, we worry that the idea of a central
governor is only appealing on its surface. Just as with the resource
model it is trying to supplant, the central governor model is
biologically implausible and, worse, unfalsifiable, appearing more
and more like some sort of all-knowing homunculus. We make
this claim for three reasons.
First, while the preservation of bodily homeostasis during
exertion makes for an elegant ultimate account, the fact
that such important homeostatic concerns can be overturned
with even small changes in motivational value renders the
ultimate account toothless. If even mild incentives, such as
subliminally presented smiling faces (Blanchfield et al., 2014b)
can reverse people’s tendency to slacken physical effort, to
what extent can effort—especially mental effort—meaningfully
threaten homeostasis and cause bodily harm to begin with?
Second, despite the central governor being thought to take
as input information about the metabolic needs of the body,
there is no credible evidence that mental effort (i.e., thinking)
actually consumes inordinate amounts of energy (Raichle and
Mintun, 2006). To what extent, then, do energy considerations
play a role in throttling mental effort? Third, the most recent
version of the central governor (Noakes, 2012), is now so all-
encompassing that it cannot be falsified by any possible array of
data.
PROBLEMS WITH THE GOVERNOR
The principal claim of the central governor model is that
the brain dynamically and subconsciously regulates physical
exertion by afferent inputs from the body, thereby allowing
for the completion of a given task in a safe manner (Noakes
et al., 2005). Crucially, this subconscious regulation of physical
exertion is enacted to serve the ultimate function of preventing
homeostatic breakdown and serious bodily damage. For example,
during intense exercise the central governor is thought to
prevent myocardial ischemia (Noakes, 1997), which results
from insufficient blood flow to the heart that can lead to
damage in the heart muscle. Evans et al. (2015) suggest
mental exertion might be implemented by the same neural
circuitry as physical exertion, with mental exertion co-opting
or exapting the machinery of the central governor to serve
the same ultimate function: prevent homeostatic breakdowns.
In the case of mental effort, the central governor is ostensibly
there to prevent profligate energy use and to prevent strains
to various biological systems, including the cardiovascular and
immune systems (Muraven et al., 2006; Segerstrom and Nes,
2007).
If Biological Concerns Are So Crucial,
How Can They Be So Readily
Abandoned?
Despite the intuitive appeal of a system working for the ultimate
function of preventing homeostatic breakdown, it is difficult
to see evidence of this ultimate function at work given just
how easily this ultimate function is overturned by motivational
incentives, and how little actual energy is required for mental
effort.
If the central governor is truly there to prevent homeostatic
breakdown, surely simple incentives like motivational self-talk
should have no impact (Blanchfield et al., 2014a). Indeed, an
earlier version of the central governor model explicitly stated
that conscious override was not possible or desirable: “the
presence of conscious over-ride would be undesirable because
it would increase or maintain the exercise intensity, thereby
threatening homoeostasis” (Noakes et al., 2005, p. 121). If
homeostasis is the ultimate function, then motivational override
makes little sense. However, it is now abundantly clear that
motives matter a great deal, with people being able to push
themselves to evermore heights of physical endurance. Indeed,
even when people physically exert themselves to the point of
exhaustion, they are able to exert themselves even more if
sufficiently motivated (Marcora and Staiano, 2010; McCormick
et al., 2015). The same holds for mental effort (Boksem et al.,
2006).
While it is true that motivation has now been incorporated
as an important input into the workings of the central governor
(Noakes, 2012), and it is this modified central governor
that forms the basis of Evans et al.’s (2015) model, such
motivational override is thought to only occur during life-
threatening situations or other extreme circumstances (e.g.,
high-stakes sports competition). The idea here is that the
consequences of motivational override are so extreme—including
myocardial ischemia, torn muscles, ruptured tendons, broken
teeth, even death—that override should occur very rarely and
only in extreme circumstances. In reality, motivation, even slight
and subtle motivation (e.g., Blanchfield et al., 2014a), appears
perfectly capable of regularly overriding this supposed ultimate
function.
If something as slight as the viewing of a subliminal
smiling face can get people to exercise for longer (Blanchfield
et al., 2014b), in what way can we say that the governor is
driven by some all-important ultimate function that should
only be overridden in extreme circumstances? It is clear that
people can override the after-effects of mental fatigue by
subtle inducements, like interacting with someone who is polite
(Muraven et al., 2008); it is also clear that perceptions of effort
are more consequential than actual effort in determining mental
performance over time (Clarkson et al., 2010; Werle et al.,
2014). Such findings are inconsistent with the notion that the
application of mental effort or feelings of depletion are governed
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by physical considerations (i.e., homeostatic signals from the
body).
In contrast, the body contains a number of veritable
subconscious control systems to preserve homeostasis that
cannot be consciously overridden. For example, the sudomotor
control system, which controls sweating, is a subconscious
system that functions to preserve thermal homeostasis. No
matter how motivated one is not to sweat—for example, at
a job interview or on a first date—the sudomotor system
will make you sweat when you feel hot. Motivation cannot
override this veritable homeostatic system, just like motivation
should not be able to override any subconscious homeostatic
system controlling the exertion of effort. In our view, the
fact that even subtle motives can override the supposed hard
limits of the central governor suggests that the determinants
of fatigue and subjective effort cannot be based on sensing
depleted energy sources or other sensory signals from the
body.
Does the Central Governor Modulate
Exertion Based on Available Energy?
An attractive feature of the central governor model is that it
is thought to incorporate information about bodily needs for
energy (as well as motivation) in modulating effortful exertion.
Effort is throttled, in other words, to conserve energy for future
use. This only makes sense, however, if mental energy actually
consumes meaningful amount of energy. There is no credible
evidence supporting this, however, (Kurzban, 2010). Despite
muscular claims that mental effort leads to meaningful drops in
glucose (Gailliot et al., 2007), it is now clear that these claims
are biologically implausible. Studies using Positron Emission
Tomography (PET), which offer direct measurement of glucose
metabolism in the brain, suggest that while the brain consumes
lots of energy, most of this energy consumption is for intrinsic,
basal metabolism that is just as evident during rest as during
mental effort. More critically, relative to this high rate of basal
metabolism, the amount consumed by evoked tasks is remarkably
low (Raichle and Mintun, 2006), with some suggesting that
effortful tasks might increase glucose consumption by at most
0.2 calories (Kurzban, 2010), an amount readily circulating and
available in the brain. Thus, even supporters of the resource
model (e.g., Baumeister, 2014) now concede that there is very
little evidence supporting the notion that mentally effortful tasks
consume any more energy than non-effortful tasks (e.g., Marcora
et al., 2009).
If mental effort does not meaningfully deplete energy, of
what use is a central governor that supposedly monitors energy
expenditure? In our view, such energy monitoring is superfluous
and makes the central governor redundant with models that talk
mostly about motives and goals (e.g., Marcora, 2008; Inzlicht
et al., 2014; Kool and Botvinick, 2014). While Evans et al. (2015)
discuss many other bodily signals that feed into the central
governor to determine the amount of effort to exert—including
signals about cortisol levels, immune system activity, thermal
conditions of the body, and so on—recent research makes clear
that perception of effort is not directly determined by such
afferent bodily signals (Marcora, 2009), but instead might reflect
activity in premotor and/or motor areas of the brain (Marcora,
2008; de Morree and Marcora, 2015).
Can the Central Governor Model be
Falsified?
One of the things that separates scientific theories from non-
scientific theories are that the former can be falsified (Popper,
2005). Although there are problems with falsificationism,
especially when we ask if a specific theory has been falsified by
any one specific empirical observation (Godfrey-Smith, 2003), a
theory needs to be falsifiable in principle. That is, in order to
determine the quality of a theory we need to place it at risk of
being disconfirmed; and only when a theory withstands multiple
such risks, can we say that the theory is a good one.
In our view, the central governor model is not falsifiable. It did
not start out that way, however. In the original formulation of the
theory, the central governor was said to be a subconscious system
that could not be overridden by conscious forces, lest it threaten
homeostasis (Noakes et al., 2005). This is a falsifiable statement
because if one finds that conscious motives can override states
of fatigue, one can falsify the theory. And, it is now abundantly
clear that conscious override exists, thereby falsifying the theory
(McCormick et al., 2015). Instead of abandoning the theory,
however, proponents of the central governor simply amended
the model such that conscious override is now possible, with
motivation being one of many determinants of physical exertion.
As we note above, the problem with this sleight of hand is that
it now undermines the very function of the central governor, to
guard against homeostatic breakdown during exertion.
Worse it makes the theory unfalsifiable in principle: “The
prediction of this model is that potentially everything. . .can
potentially affect athletic performance” (Noakes, 2012, p. 6,
emphasis in the original). If a model suggests that everything can
determine how long someone mentally and physically perseveres,
can such a model ever be demonstrated to be false? Can such a
model ever offer specific insights to understanding why physical
or mental effort is aversive and why people tend to avoid it? In
our view, the central governor resembles the fabled homunculus
and is another theoretical soup stone (Navon, 1984)—it appears
to do theoretical work, but upon closer inspection it actually does
very little.
CONCLUSION
Making a connection between mental fatigue and physical fatigue
is laudable and we agree that much can be learned from such
cross-fertilization. The problem, in our view, is that the central
governor model is controversial at best and unfalsifiable at worst.
It offers an ultimate account of fatigue that is disconfirmed in
the most mundane of situations and, given present knowledge of
physiology, it is not clear if it can deliver what it promises.
Bridging the gap between mental and physical fatigue
is a laudable goal. There is already well established and
increasingly accepted work in exercise physiology that
has looked to psychology to understand the factors that
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determine disengagement during physical tasks (Marcora, 2008;
Marcora and Staiano, 2010; McCormick et al., 2015). This
psychobiological model based on motivational intensity theory
(Brehm and Self, 1989; Gendolla and Richter, 2010) suggests
that perception of effort and potential motivation are the
central determinants of task engagement, with people consciously
deciding how much or how little effort to apply based on a
number of considerations. We believe that the gap between
mental and physical fatigue is not very broad, but we would rather
not bridge it with a flawed model that is increasingly out of favor.
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